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Abstract 
Historically, guilty pleas have always been considered a way of rationalising 
criminal procedures. Recent budget cuts have pushed the Crown Prosecution 
Service to find new solutions to save money. Two main saving measures could 
potentially affect plea bargaining in practice: maximising the use of paralegal staff 
and the Early Guilty Plea Scheme. Based on empirical observations and interviews, 
this paper examines the practical and theoretical consequences of these money-
saving measures on plea bargaining. 
Introduction 
From the very start, guilty pleas were a way of rationalising criminal procedures. 
Although there was always the possibility for a suspect to plead guilty in Anglo-
American courts, this was rarely used and was actually discouraged by judges until the 
19th century.1 In particular, Alschuler states that there is evidence to “strongly suggest 
that the courts would have condemned the practice of plea bargaining had they had 
occasion to do so.”2 Langbein argues that guilty pleas were introduced in nineteenth 
century common law procedure because “the rise of adversary procedure and the law of 
evidence injected vast complexity into jury trial and made it unworkable as a routine 
dispositive procedure.”3 His analysis is supported by other authors4 who contend “that 
                                                          
1 Alschuler, A. W. (1979) Plea Bargaining and Its History, Law & Society Review 13(2), pp. 211-245. 
2 Ibid. p. 219. 
3 Langbein, J. H. (1979) Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, Law & Society Review 13(2), 
p. 261. 
4 Friedman, L. and Percival, R. (1981) The Roots of Justice: Crime and Punishment in Alameda County, 
California, 1870-1910, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Friedman, L. (1983) 'Courts Over 
Time: A Survey of Theories and Research' in Boyum, K. O. and Mather, L. (eds.) Empirical Theories About 
Courts, New York: Longman, 38; Feeley, M. (1982) Plea Bargaining and The Structure of The Criminal 
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the guilty plea system emerged to displace jury trials when professionals, police and 
lawyers, entered the fray and set the system right, i.e. with due regard to notions of cost 
efficiency and justice.”5 
Beside caseload pressure, other research suggests that the rise of plea bargaining can 
also be linked to “changing ideas of punishment and sentencing, as well as expansion of 
the criminal law”.6 For Mather who looked particularly at California's criminal courts, 
plea bargaining was used more frequently from the mid-nineteenth century because it 
“facilitated the individualization of punishment”.7 McConville and Mirsky, studying 
decisions of the leading criminal court in New York City between 1800 and 1865, 
refuted the argument of professionalisation to explain the rise in guilty pleas. Instead, 
they showed that lesser plea convictions came to dominate for political and societal 
reasons: “clientilism and legitimation were incorporated within the larger framework of 
societal concerns over the foreign born as a suspect population which served to 
underpin a new criminology and the emergent state system of crime control.”8 
Nevertheless, the recent push in England and Wales to formalise and regulate plea 
bargaining can clearly be linked to efforts to rationalise criminal procedures. Sentence 
reductions were given a statutory footing and there has been a continuing focus of the 
government and the courts on increasing the number of guilty pleas, including the 
introduction of advance indication of sentence, plea discussions in serious fraud cases, 
minimum sentencing and the government's proposals (subsequently abandoned) to 
increase the maximum discount for a guilty plea to 50%. The Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice made clear that “[t]he primary reason for the sentence discount is to 
encourage defendants who know themselves to be guilty to plead accordingly and so 
enable the resources which would be expended in a contested case to be saved”.9 
In strict theory, in the adversarial system where the judge is limited by her role as an 
umpire and thus cannot go beyond what the parties present to her, it does indeed make 
sense not to run a full trial if the accused admits her guilt. If there is no debate about 
guilt, there is no need for each party to present evidence in this regard or for the judge 
to decide upon it. By contrast, guilty pleas did not emerge in continental Europe where 
systems have inquisitorial roots because, in an inquisitorial system, the judge does not 
only have an adjudicative role but also actively seeks the truth. In these circumstances, 
it can be understood that the role of continental judges would not allow a simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Process, Journal of Justice Systems 73, p. 338; Feeley, M. and Lester, C. (1994) 'Legal Complexity and the 
Transformation of the Criminal Process' in Gouron, A.; Mayali, L.; Padoa Schioppa, A. and Simon, D. (eds.) 
Subjektivierung des Justiziellen Beweisverfahrens, Frankfurt: Klostermann, p. 334; Fisher, G. (2000) Plea 
Bargaining's Triumph, Yale Law Journal 109, p. 857. 
5 McConville, M. and Mirsky, C. L. (2005) Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, p. 327. 
6 Mather, L. M. (1979) Comments on the History of Plea Bargaining, Law & Society Review 13 (2), p. 281. 
7 Ibid., p. 282. 
8 McConville, M. and Mirsky, C. L. (2005) Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining, Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, p. 325. 
9 Runciman, W. G. (1993) Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, London: HMSO, p. 110. 
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confession by the accused to remove the judicial power to investigate the facts of the 
case and to decide on the guilt of the accused. 
Continental Europe resisted for many years the introduction of a formal guilty plea 
procedure. However, the ever-growing burden on criminal justice systems overcame 
this resistance. In France, the introduction of guilty pleas was progressive and emerged 
from prosecutorial practice before being introduced in law.10 From the 1980s, 
prosecutors started to innovate to diversify the responses they could provide in cases of 
minor offences. Prior to that, if there was enough evidence to prove the accused's guilt, 
they could only decide either to prosecute or not to prosecute for reasons of public 
interest. They now have a vast array of alternatives to prosecution (caution, mediation, 
conditional caution), when the suspect admits her guilt.11 Since 1999, the composition 
pénale allows prosecutors to give small penalties (e.g. a fine) to the accused if she 
admits her guilt. Finally, in 2004 a formal guilty plea procedure called the comparution 
sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité was introduced.12 The circular issued by the 
Ministry of Justice for the application of the 2004 law does clearly state that the new 
“guilty plea” procedure “should allow a better management of criminal cases, giving 
criminal courts more time to dedicate to the most complex cases”.13 
 
The CPS and the 2010 Spending Review 
In October 2010, the new government announced the outcome of its Comprehensive 
Spending Review: all agencies in the criminal justice system would see their budgets 
cut. The Ministry of Justice budget was to be cut by 23%, the central Government grant 
to the police by 20% and the Crown Prosecution Service budget by 25%. 
For the CPS, this meant a reduction in overall staffing: in 2009-10, the CPS employed 
8,283 staff; in March 2013, only 7,329 employees worked at the CPS.14 This is the result 
of a recruitment freeze and of voluntary redundancies. Electronic case files have started 
replacing paper-based files. The headquarters in London were relocated in less 
expensive premises and their size was reduced. This paper will concentrate on two 
important saving measures which have consequences on the way plea bargaining is 
conducted by the CPS: maximising the use of paralegal staff and the Early Guilty Plea 
scheme. 
                                                          
10 See Saas, C. (2004) De la composition pénale au plaider-coupable: le pouvoir de sanction du procureur, 
Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 2004 (4), pp. 827-843. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Hodgson, J. (2012) ‘Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice’ 
in Luna, E. and Wade, M. (eds) The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
13 Circular of 2nd September 2004 available at: http://www.justice.gouv.fr/bulletin-officiel/3-
dqcg95e.htm [Last visited: 14th May 2013]. 
14 CPS Workforce Management Information available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/data/expenditure/index.html#workforce [Last visited: 15th June 2013]. 
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This paper is based on ethnographic observations carried out during four months at a 
CPS office. During these four months, interviews with CPS staff (Crown Prosecutors, 
Associate Prosecutors, Crown Advocates, etc.) were also undertaken.15 Quotes in this 
paper are from interviews or from conversations during the observation phase. 
 
Plea bargaining and paralegal staff 
Efficiency concerns and money saving measures do not only date back to 2010. Already 
in 2008, Sir Ken Macdonald QC, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)16 at the time, 
stated: “The current economic environment means that public bodies have to become 
leaner and smarter. The CPS has already begun this work.”17 He added: “This means that 
we are always looking for ways to do things more effectively and efficiently.”18 
One of the ways the CPS profess to save money is “maximising the use of paralegal 
staff”.19 Nowadays, Associate Prosecutors (APs) prosecute almost all cases at 
magistrates' courts, except for contested hearings, despite not being legally qualified. 
This is the result of progressive legislative extension of their powers over several years. 
APs used to be called designated caseworkers and Section 53 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 increased their powers beyond the presentation of bail applications to the 
conduct of certain criminal proceedings in magistrates' courts. They were renamed 
Associate Prosecutors under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. These 
changes also have the advantage of providing new career progression opportunities for 
non-legal staff at the CPS.20 
APs are selected amongst CPS staff who have “experience of casework within the 
criminal justice system or of lay presentation”21 and “a working knowledge of criminal 
law and its application, magistrates' courts procedure and the criminal justice 
                                                          
15 I am very grateful to the CPS for allowing me to complete this fieldwork. Confidentiality rules do not 
allow me to name them but I would like to thank all the staff who welcomed me in their office and agreed 
to be interviewed. This research would not have been possible without their help. 
16 The DPP heads the CPS under the superintendence of the Attorney General, who is accountable to 
Parliament for the prosecution authority. 
17 Macdonald, K. Letter from the Director to the Attorney General, in CPS Annual Report and Resources 
Accounts 2007-2008, available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2007/ [Last visited 1st 
August 2013]. 
18 Ibid. 
19 “The responsibility for continuous improvement in the coming year lies primarily with the 13 Areas, 
which will be looking to further increase efficiency by reducing the number of administrative tasks that 
need to be undertaken and maximising the use of paralegal staff to support our prosecutions”, Optimum 
Business Model and Paralegal Career Family Structure, in CPS Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2010-
2011, available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010/optimum_business_model.html 
[Last visited 15th May 2013]. 
20 See, for example, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/careers/legal_professional_careers/legal_trainees/salma_yousef_profile/index.ht
ml [Last visited 31st July 2013]. 
21 Annex D – Associate Prosecutors Training and Selection, in CPS Annual Report and Resource Accounts 
2010-2011, available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010/annex_d.html [Last visited 
15th May 2013]. 
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system”.22 Typically, they have worked for a number of years for the CPS as 
administrative/paralegal staff. In the CPS office I observed, several APs had been 
working for the CPS for over 25 years, none of them had less than 7 years’ experience at 
the CPS. 
Once selected, they undertake two weeks of training: the first week is a foundation 
course in legal principles and the second week is an advocacy course. They have to pass 
an independent assessment of competence before being authorised to practice as an AP. 
They also undertake further training for bail applications, youth courts and domestic 
violence. 
Section 7A of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 states that APs have “the powers and 
rights of audience of a Crown Prosecutor in relation to (...) the conduct of criminal 
proceedings in magistrates’ courts other than trials”.23 The law specifies that APs “shall 
exercise any such powers subject to instructions given to [them] by the Director”.24 The 
Director mentioned in this section is the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) who 
heads the CPS. The DPP has thus published instructions to Associate Prosecutors to 
frame their role.25 According to paragraph 3.5 of these instructions, “APs exercise these 
powers and rights of audience on the instructions of a Crown Prosecutor (...)” 
(emphasis added). In reviewing straightforward magistrates' court cases, Schedule 4 
states that APs have the power to make only minor amendments to the charge or 
summons. Thus, APs are not permitted to make decisions about accepting pleas or bases 
of plea that differ from the original charges. This denies them any plea bargaining role 
in theory. 
Although authorising APs to engage in plea negotiations would be consistent with 
efficiency, this is outweighed by concerns to ensure that major legal decisions and those 
around case disposal are taken only by Crown Prosecutors. However, I have observed 
on several occasions that APs do take on a plea bargaining role in practice. This is driven 
by the practical reality of magistrates' courts' listings. In theory, if a defence lawyer 
offers a plea for a lesser offence than charged or offers a plea on the basis of different 
facts than on the prosecution file, an AP must ring a lawyer at the CPS office to ask for 
authorisation to accept it. If plea bargaining is anticipated by the AP when she prepares 
for court, she can discuss the case with a lawyer and obtain authorisation a priori for 
accepting a specific plea. But where this has not been anticipated, it is not practical for 
APs to ask the court for time to consult with a superior every time a plea is offered by 
the defence. Even when the AP is able to consult with a CPS lawyer to obtain 
authorisation, the impact of this as a form of supervision is limited. In practice, it is 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 Section 7A of the Prosecution Of Offences Act 1985, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/23/section/7A [Last visited: 29th June 2013]. 
24 Ibid. 
25 These instructions have been published on the CPS website and are available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/dpp_instructions.html [Last visited: 29th June 
2013]. 
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unlikely that the CPS lawyer will be able to review the file fully before giving her advice. 
It is therefore likely that she will take her decision on the summary that the AP will give 
her orally. In other words, even when lawyers are consulted, the influence of the AP on 
the decision should not be underestimated. 
APs rarely initiated plea bargaining. In most instance, it was defence lawyers who 
offered a guilty plea to lesser charges or on a different factual basis. 
For example, in a case where a defendant was charged with common assault on his 
partner, the defence lawyer approached the AP at court to ask whether she was 
prepared to accept a plea on part of the facts. The AP responded favourably as she 
wanted to avoid trial where a 7-year old witness would have had to give evidence. She 
told the defence lawyer that she wanted an admission to a serious enough assault, so 
that the sentence could reflect the seriousness of the facts. In the end, the defendant 
entered a guilty plea on the basis of a defence statement admitting to all facts as set in 
the prosecution file, except for a headlock. 
Even when a District Crown Prosecutor was on duty to answer queries from APs at 
court, which was every day in the area I observed, APs confirmed in interviews that 
practical constraints meant they had to bend the rules. 
“We're not meant to accept any basis of plea. (...) That's a technicality. The 
thing is you've got to use your common sense over there because, to a certain 
degree, you just have to, otherwise you'd be stopping every two minutes to 
make a phone call to the office.” [EW12_AP4] 
Several APs told me in interviews that, with experience, they knew which pleas were 
acceptable. They were confident that their managers would back them up when they 
returned to the office. 
“We're quite lucky that our management back us up completely. Basically, 
you can make decisions at court, even though you're probably not supposed 
to make decisions at court, but you can in the knowledge that you're going to 
be backed up on it. Because clearly, we're all stretched, there's not enough 
staff, you can't always get hold of somebody. They might be talking to 
someone else and you might only be allowed to stand the case down for five 
minutes.(...) I think when you've been in the job long enough you know what 
would rock the boat and what wouldn't.” [EW12_AP5] 
As can clearly be seen in this last comment, resource constraints limiting the availability 
of CPS lawyers are also part of the reason why APs do make decisions at court instead of 
asking for prior authorisation from a lawyer as they are legally required to, along with 
the reality of court listings which preclude APs being given the time to ring the office. 
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Guilty plea rate: a prosecutorial target? 
The guilty plea rate in the magistrates' courts and the Crown Court has remained 
relatively stable over the past few years. Although the rate remains stable in the tables 
below, a decline in the number of cases going to court can be observed, especially at the 
magistrates' courts. This could be explained by a rise in out-of-court disposals, which 
also require an admission by the defendant. This would actually mean a rise of 
consensual justice as a whole. This observation was made by several legal actors at the 
magistrates' court during the observational phase of my fieldwork. Defence lawyers, 
APs, but also legal clerks mentioned the fact that the police were sending fewer cases to 
court. This became apparent to them because the court's workload was lighter, meaning 
that some courtrooms remained closed some afternoons. They attributed this to budget 
cuts, i.e. the police lacked resources to investigate all crimes, but also to growing 
numbers of out-of-court disposals, such as fixed penalty notices and cautions. Other 
reasons could also be put forward to explain why the caseload is diminishing, such as an 
actual fall in the crime rate. 
 
Table 126 
Magistrates' courts: 
case outcomes 
2009-2010 % 2010-2011 % 2011-2012 % 
Guilty Pleas 589,789 67.6 570,073 67.8 538,568 68.4 
 
Table 227 
Crown Court: 
case outcomes 
2009-2010 % 2010-2011 % 2011-2012 % 
Guilty Pleas 81,000 73.5 84,742 72.5 78,106 72.8 
 
It is clear that an increase in the guilty plea rate would mean great savings for the CPS: 
the DPP indicated that “[t]he average cost to the CPS to prepare a case for guilty plea in 
the magistrates' court is around £160. The average cost to prepare a trial is around 
£850. And, of course, there is the time factor: it takes a good deal longer to prepare a 
                                                          
26 Data from CPS annual report 2011/2012 available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2011/annex_b.html [Last visited 15th May 2013]. 
27 Ibid. 
9 
 
case for trial than it does to prepare a case for a plea.”28 However, an increase in the 
guilty plea rate is not a target for Crown Prosecutors. Instead, the focus has been on the 
timeliness of these guilty pleas. 
In November 2010, following the Spending Review, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC) suggested solutions to reduce waste in the Criminal Justice 
System. It clearly stated that late guilty pleas were part of the problem: “The majority of 
defendants plead guilty (67%), but 41% do so late in the day, when large quantities of 
paperwork have been prepared and duplicated by agencies, the hearing has been 
scheduled and victims and witnesses have arrived in court to give evidence. A 
conservative estimate of the cost of this additional nugatory work is in the region of 
£150 million. The money saved by a 25% reduction in late guilty pleas could fund Victim 
Support for one year.”29 
The Director of Public Prosecutions discussed the impact of the Spending Review on the 
CPS and endorsed this idea of timely pleas in saying: “Now, most cases – the vast 
majority of cases – are guilty pleas. That means that we need to get those cases on and 
disposed of as swiftly as possible, and I'm a big fan of the work that's being done in 
Liverpool, with the Early Guilty Plea Scheme, where the aim is to have just one hearing 
to dispose of a case.”30 During my fieldwork at a CPS office, I was given access to a 
document entitled “Efficiency & Effectiveness Measures 2012/13 Performance”. It 
detailed CPS “key priority targets”. One of them was entitled “Guilty plea rates and 
disposals” and detailed the average number of hearings for contested cases and for 
guilty pleas in the area. The national target for the average number of hearings for guilty 
pleas is 2.1. The area I was observing was well within the target at 1.98. Also a “key 
priority target” is “Trial effectiveness and timeliness”. Within this section, the “cracked 
trial rate” is a local indicator and the target is 30%. A cracked trial is a case listed for 
trial but then a guilty plea is entered or the prosecution offer no evidence. The area I 
observed was well above the target at 47.74% of cracked trials. As a result, the reasons 
for cracked trials were scrutinised in more detail, showing that late guilty pleas were 
the main reason for cracked trials (26.44% of cracked trials). Thus, although the guilty 
plea rate in itself is not a prosecutorial target, prosecutors are told to improve the 
timeliness of guilty pleas. 
Prosecutors seem to have integrated this and their attitudes to guilty pleas are in phase 
with these targets. Thus, when a senior judge complained to a CPS manager that there 
were not enough guilty pleas in cases in an undercover investigation, Crown 
                                                          
28 Starmer, K. QC, DPP, “Challenge and opportunity – DPP's address to the London Justices' Clerks' 
Society”, 11th March 2011, available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/challenge_and_opportunity/ [Last visited 15th May 2013]. 
29 Stop The Drift: A Focus on 21st-century Criminal Justice, HMIC, November 2010, p. 4, available at: 
http://www.hmic.gov.uk/publication/stop-the-drift/ [Last visited 14th May 2013]. 
30 Video interview available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/dpp_discusses_impact_of_spending_review_on_cps/ [Last visited 
14th May 2013]. 
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Prosecutors did not consider that it was their job to put pressure on the defence to 
plead guilty, even when they thought the prosecution case was very strong and it would 
be in the defendant's interests to plead guilty, with one prosecutor saying: 
“You can't tell defence lawyers how to do their job” [CTL4]. 
However, another prosecutor said to me: 
“It is very frustrating to have to go through all this work for the defendant to 
plead guilty at PCMH [Plea and Case Management Hearing]” [SCP14] 
The Early Guilty Plea (EGP) scheme has been designed to answer these concerns of 
timeliness of pleas at the Crown Court. 
 
The Early Guilty Plea Scheme 
The EGP scheme was introduced by the Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales.31 
The rationale for the EGP scheme is to secure a guilty plea at an earlier part in the 
process rather than on the day of trial. This may result in some saving of CPS/police 
resource and it could be argued that there are also benefits for defendants who will 
spend less time on remand and will receive a sentence discount. It is also contended 
that it reduces anxiety of victims and witnesses by early notification that the case is not 
contested or that their evidence is not required. 
Pilots were run in several areas before the scheme was rolled out across the whole 
country in 2012. The DPP stated that: “As a large proportion of cases committed and 
sent to the Crown Court result in guilty pleas, the scheme (...) aims to identify these at an 
early stage, separate these cases into bespoke Early Guilty Plea Courts and expedite the 
plea and sentence, thereby producing a just, expeditious and cost effective outcome. (…) 
It also, especially, prevents unnecessary police and CPS file build in preparing a trial 
file.”32 
The EGP scheme encourages the CPS to have a more proactive role in plea bargaining. It 
is mainly targeted at either-way offences not suitable for summary trial and is linked to 
the abolition of committal hearings at the magistrates' courts. After the first hearing at 
the magistrates' court and if it was decided that the case was not suitable for summary 
                                                          
31 See http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legal-aid/early-guilty-plea-scheme.pdf [Last visited 1st 
August 2013]. 
32 Starmer, K. QC, DPP, Police Superintendents' Association of England and Wales Annual Conference 
2010 Lecture, 15th September 2010, available at: 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/articles/dpp_s_annual_lecture_to_the_police_superintendents__2010_confe
rence/ [Last Visited: 15th June 2013]. 
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trial, the file is given to a Crown Advocate33 for review instead of going directly to the 
Crown Court team for a committal file to be prepared. 
The Crown Advocate reviews the charges and should check what pleas would be 
acceptable to the prosecution. She then telephones the defence solicitor to speak to her 
about it. The EGP scheme therefore encourages communication between defence and 
prosecution about plea bargaining. The idea is to encourage defence and prosecution to 
discuss possible pleas at an early stage and not to wait until the last minute, i.e. at trial, 
to have this discussion. The problem is that, at this stage, the defence does not have full 
disclosure of the prosecution file. They only receive initial disclosure before the 
magistrates' court's hearing. The Crown Advocate also only has the initial file as the full 
file from the police will be received later on. 
This means that this form of plea bargaining, which takes place by telephone discussion, 
occurs between people who have not got all the cards in hand to make a fully informed 
decision. Clearly, this could potentially be quite detrimental to the accused. In 
particular, neither the Crown Advocate, nor the defence solicitor have access to fully 
transcribed interviews of the defendant at the police station, they only have Short 
Descriptive Notes (SDN) taken by the police during the interviews. Similarly, they do 
not have any of the unused material. All these documents will be sent later on by the 
police to the CPS who will then disclose all relevant material to the defence. 
In their research partly based on interviews with defendants, Hedderman and Moxon 
suggest that “[i]t seems that decisions to plead guilty were largely based on a realistic 
assessment on the chances of acquittal, and the potential benefits in terms of sentence 
severity.”34 This 'realistic assessment' is not possible without sufficient information on 
the prosecution file. Hedderman and Moxon found that “over a third of those questioned 
said that there had been some change in the charges against them after the case was 
committed to the Crown Court, of whom almost two thirds said that they had had one or 
more charges dropped or less serious charges substituted.”35 Timeliness of guilty pleas 
is therefore not simply a defence issue but might also result from inadequate 
prosecution disclosure or a deal being offered by the CPS late in the day. 
In order to maximise the use of paralegal staff, the CPS have had to adapt their working 
procedures. In particular, Crown Prosecutors do not have ownership of the files they 
deal with. Instead, several members of staff deal with the same file at different stages of 
the process. Thus, a Crown Prosecutor will make the initial decision about charging, an 
Associate Prosecutor will attend the first hearing at the magistrates' court, another 
Crown Prosecutor will prepare the committal file and a Crown Advocate will prosecute 
                                                          
33 Crown Advocates, previously known as Higher Courts Advocates (HCAs), are the in-house CPS lawyers 
who are entitled by professional qualification and CPS designation to appear in the Crown Court. 
34 Hedderman, C. and Moxon, D. (1992) Magistrates' court or Crown Court? Mode of trial decisions and 
sentencing, Home Office Research Study No. 125, London: HMSO, p. 25. 
35 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the case at Crown Court.36 This makes it difficult for the defence to find the right person 
to speak to at the CPS if they wish to engage in plea bargaining. The Early Guilty Plea 
scheme offers defence and prosecution the opportunity to speak about the case and 
might prevent some late guilty pleas that currently arise because of communication 
difficulties. However, it also encourages a discussion to take place between two parties 
who do not have all information on the case. 
The rules governing the pre-trial disclosure of evidence impose extensive obligations on 
the CPS at a number of stages in a criminal case, obligations that are critical to a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Understandably, those rules entail a great amount of 
work for the police and the CPS and, consequently, a high cost is associated with 
respecting them. However, the right to a fair trial requires that the defendant be 
provided with the evidence that will be given in support of the allegations against her as 
well as the evidence that weakens the prosecution case or assists the defence case. The 
defence should not be encouraged to enter a guilty plea without having been able first 
to check the strength of the prosecution case fully without risking compromising the 
fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence. 
 
Conclusion 
Plea bargaining has developed dramatically in the past few years. The starting point was 
the view that if the suspect/accused recognises her guilt, there is no need to have a 
judicial debate about it. The overload of modern criminal justice systems meant that it 
became necessary to divert more and more cases from trial and defendants are strongly 
encouraged to plead guilty through sentence incentives. Indeed, the system would 
simply not work if all cases went to trial. 
The current context of budget cuts forces criminal justice agencies to go a step further 
and to make sure that defendants plead guilty as early as possible. This has been done 
through gradual sentence incentives – the earlier the defendant pleads, the greater the 
discount is – but also by encouraging the CPS to become more proactive in the plea 
bargaining process through the EGP scheme. 
In the original theory of plea bargaining, the defence would take the initiative to start 
plea bargaining through a spontaneous confession. This confession became gradually 
less and less spontaneous, as defendants were strongly encouraged to plead through 
various incentives. With the EGP scheme, plea bargaining is now clearly initiated by the 
prosecution at a very early stage, thus pushing the defence to make a decision even 
before they have received full disclosure of the case against the accused. 
 
                                                          
36 For most cases, different Crown Advocates are in charge of the plea and case management hearing and 
trial. 
